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SEEING GOOD IN A WORLD OF SUFFERING 
INCARNATION AS GOD'S TRANSFORMING VISION 
INTRODUCTION 
At the conclusion of Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor sketches an 
account of the ironic ways in which pursuit of the high moral aims of 
modernity often result in humans inflicting unspeakable violence on one 
another. He contends that "the highest spiritual ideals and aspirations 
also threaten to lay the most crushing burdens on humankind. The great 
spiritual visions of human history have also been poisoned chalices, the 
causes of untold misery and even savagery. "1 Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky 
provide paradigmatic explorations of this irony in which "the demands 
of benevolence can exact a high cost in self-love and self-fulfillment, 
which may in the end require payment in self-destruct~on or even in 
violence. "2 Taylor identifies mUltiple vectors at play in framing the tra-
jectory of this irony. One functions in consequence of human intentions 
and actions that, even as they engage high moral ideals such as justice or 
benevolence, may also distort or misdirect them. These have all too often 
resulted in imparting to human history a thrust deflecting lofty ideals onto 
paths leading to self-destruction or the infliction of violence on others 
- an outcome depressingly captured in an expression that, even if never 
uttered, became archetypically associated with the American war in Viet-
nam: "We had to destroy the village in order to save it." Another impor-
tant vector lies in the often overwhelming power these aspirations have 
to move us to pursue genuine good: The demands of justice or benevo-
lence become irresistibly imperious to those who unblinkingly recognize 
their full moral weight. This power enables these ideals to function as 
overarching "hypergoods" that, without qualification or compromise, 
must override lesser goods; in consequence they render us capable not 
only of effecting great good but also of wreaking great destruction upon 
other goods deemed "lesser" - and thus upon those who value such 
lesser goods - in the name of higher, more noble aspirations. 
1. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) 519. 
2. Ibid., 518. 
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Despite his recognition of the destructive power resident in these high 
moral ideals and our pursuit of them, Taylor does not take "the self-
destructive consequences of a spiritual aspiration as a refutation of the 
aspiration."3 Even as he acknowledges that "[p ]rudence constantly 
advises us to scale down our hopes and circumscribe our vision," he also 
affirms that "we deceive ourselves if we pretend that nothing is denied 
thereby of our humanity."4 Taylor does not clearly specify in Sources of 
the Self precisely what it is of our humanity that is thereby denied; but 
the tenor of the final chapter suggests that curbing these aspirations 
involves denial of elements crucial for constituting our humanity as a 
fundamentally spiritual reality. 
An effort to provide the lineaments of what constitutes human beings 
as spiritual thus seems a major sub-text to Taylor's work, but he has yet 
to develop this concern explicitly into an anthropology of the human 
spirit.5 This essay is thus an effort to suggest one direction a "Taylorian" 
anthropology might take. I will do so in two steps. In the first, I will 
identify what appear to be important links between two of his affmna-
tions where a concern for reconstituting an account of the spiritual seems 
thoroughly embedded. One is the affirmation already noted, viz., that the 
destructive potential that may lie within lofty ideals such as justice and 
benevolence does not invalidate our aspirations to effect them as fully as 
we can. These distinctively modem foci for moral effort are, in Taylor's 
view, genuine gain and we would be diminished in lowering our sights 
away from them. The second is his affirmation of a specific marker of 
the human spirit that has emerged in the course of modernity, viz., the 
transformation of self that makes possible a "seeing good" that effects 
the good it sees. To complete this first step, I then will link these two 
affirmations to a theology of creation embedded in Taylor's expressivist 
account of language. In the light of this account, in which "language 
3. Ibid., 519. 
4. Ibid., 520. 
5. For indications of the content of such sub-text see Philip Rossi, "Divine Tran-
scendence and the 'Languages of Personal Resonance': The Work of Charles Taylor as 
a Resource for Spirituality in an Era of Post-modernity," Theology and Conversation, 
ed. J. Haers and P. De Mey, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, 
172 (Leuven : University PresslPeeters, 2004) 783-794; "The Leveling of Meaning: 
Religious Ethics in the Face of a Culture of Unconcern," Ethics in the World Religions, 
ed. Nancy Martin and Joseph Runzo (Oxford: One World Press, 2001) 161-174; 
"The Idiom of Spirit : Discourse, Human Nature, and Otherness. A Response to Philip 
Clayton and Steven Smith," Advents of the Spirit: Orientations in Pneumatology, ed. 
D. Lyle Dabney and Bradford Hinze (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 
2002) 233-239. 
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realizes man's humanity,"6 in that it forms our ways of being in the 
world, these aspirations function as fundamental markers of a genuine 
expansiveness of good that the human spirit is capable of enacting. 
The second step - taken with greater hesitation than the first - is then to 
propose that also embedded in these affirmations is an implicit theology 
of the Incarnation that resonates with the transformational dynamics of 
the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola, dynamics empowered by 
imaginative participation in the expansiveness of God's "seeing good." 
I will argue that, within Taylor's expressivist accounts of language, 
meaning, and the self, a key locus for this theology of Incarnation lies in 
his understanding of epiphanic art " as a revelation which at the same 
time defines and completes what it makes manifest. "7 This theology 
takes the human enfleshment of God's logos to be a completion of God's 
"seeing good" in Creation. In this "epiphanic" rendering ofthe Incarna-
tion, Jesus manifests, as Incarnate Logos, how the "seeing good" effected 
in Creation is completed in a "seeing good" that, entering fully into 
human brokenness in all its historical particularity and remaining abid-
ingly mindful of that brokenness, becomes a pattern for our enacting 
transformative healing. 
I 
Taylor's most striking discussion of the destructive potential in pursuit 
of high moral and spiritual aspirations takes place in the final chapter of 
Sources of the Self. Placement of this discussion - at the conclusion of 
four hundred pages of historically structured exposition of the paths con-
verging on the construction of the modem self - can obscure its connec-
tion with the more systematically focused treatment of the concepts of 
"hypergoods" and "constitutive goods" that preceded the telling of the 
history.8 Two points from the earlier discussion suggest that his account 
of these human goods holds a sub-text resonant with a theology of Crea-
tion in which the goodness of creation is affirmed as sign and manifesta-
tion of the Creator' s unsurpassable, transcendent goodness. His highlight-
ing of a transformative power consequent upon "seeing good," in 
conjunction with the importance he attaches to articulacy about the good 
as a condition for its recognition, provide two markers referencing this 
6. Taylor, "Language and Human Nature, " Human Agency and Language: Philo-
sophical Papers I (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1985) 233 . 
7. Taylor, Sources (n. 1),419. 
8. Ibid., 62-107. 
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account of good to a theology of Creation.9 In particular, articulacy, as 
the power of one's words to name aright the good that moves us - or as 
the power to speak the logos of the good - offers a link: to the theology 
of the first creation narrative of Genesis, in which God's word is the 
power that brings forth the good it utters. 
The resonance with Genesis is neither accidental nor simply a literary 
conceit. In an earlier essay, "Language and Human Nature," Taylor 
sketched the rise, eclipse, and retrieval of an expressive theory of mean-
ing with roots in an "amalgam of Christian theology and Greek philoso-
phy" according to which "God in creating the world gives embodiment 
to his ideas." 10 Part and parcel of this theory of meaning is understanding 
creation as a manifestation of God's logos: "[God's] creatures manifest 
his logos in embodying it; and they manifest the logos as fully as it can 
be manifest in the creaturely medium. There can be no more fundamen-
tal designative relation, precisely because every thing is a sign." II 
The eclipse of the expressive theory and its replacement by a designa-
tive theory (such as Condillac's) takes place as part of a more extensive 
shift involving "a polemical rejection of the vision of the world as a 
meaningful order and its replacement by a conception of the world as 
objective process." 12 The retrieval of the expressive theory, initially 
effected by Herder, reaffmns a constitutive power for language, but now 
exercised in a different mode and by a different agency than it was in the 
prior theory. The prior expressive account of meaning affirmed ontic 
power in God's logos for bringing into being a cosmos that, by its very 
being as created, thereby signifies its creator. The new expressive account 
of language is no longer about the creative logos of God; it affirms, 
rather, manifold constitutive powers to the logos of human language, of 
which the most encompassing is that of constituting our way(s) of "being 
in the world." Humanity becomes the maker of meaning, even as the 
cosmos, now an object of study according to the laws of matter in motion, 
is thereby " disenchanted" of any signifying function. 13 
9. Ibid., 70-71. 
10. Taylor, "Language" (n. 6), 222-223. 
11. Ibid., 223. 
12. Ibid., 224. 
13. Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Though: An Alternative History of Philosophy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), notes what such "disenchantment" 
brings in its wake: " ... calling something natural is a way of making it tame .. . Natural 
events are common events. They are very literally insignificant - not representations of 
something besides themselves, nor signals we need to decode. We are freed from the 
burden of thinking about them because there is nothing in them to interpret" (236). 
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What connection do these expressive accounts of meaning and lan-
guage have with Taylor's depiction of the ironic destructive outcomes of 
the human engagement with high moral aims of modernity? In particular, 
what do they have to do with his afflrmation that the destructive power 
within lofty ideals such as justice and benevolence does not thereby 
invalidate our aspirations to effect them as fully as we can? I believe a 
link lies in the central importance Taylor attaches to discerning correctly 
the conditions which make it possible for human beings to "see good" 
without illusion. In contrast to the immanent and naturalist accounts of 
these aspirations that modernity often provides, Taylor includes acknowl-
edgment of God among the conditions for an illusion-free seeing (and 
enacting) of their goOd.14 The possibility that we can have such an illu-
sion-free discernment of good thus serves as the larger frame for Taylor's 
account of "the modem identity," which he describes as "a sense of self 
defined by the powers of disengaged reason as well as of the creative 
imagination, in the characteristically modem understandings of freedom 
and dignity and rights, in the ideals of self-fulflllment and expression and 
in the demands of universal benevolence and justice." 15 
As much as this identity resulted in moral gain, so Taylor argues, its 
forging exacted a price. The fleld of play for the powers of disengaged 
reason and of creative imagination, as they have variously intersected and 
diverged in shaping modem identity, has moved away from "the original 
unity of the theistic horizon"16 out of which these powers first emerged. 
These powers now play against a horizon in which unity of meaning has 
been deeply fractured; this fracturing has occluded our capacity for rec-
ognizing the "moral sources" of the highly demanding values that such 
a self seeks to express and exhibit. The occlusion is not total. Taylor does 
not argue that the modem identity utterly blinds us to genuine goods; it 
provides, rather, the basis for views that are " ... too narrow. They find 
their way through the dilemmas of modernity by invalidating some of the 
crucial goods in contest." 17 Such "selective blindness" presents us with 
unpalatable options between "spiritual lobotomy and self-inflicted 
wounds" - i.e., between lowering, in the name of prudence, our aspira-
tions down to the moral equivalent of a Realpolitik, or "living beyond 
our moral means" in self-loathing or in contempt of others that Nietzsche 
and Dostoyevsky clearly saw as the corrosive flnal state of a practical 
14. Taylor, Sources (n. 1), 342. 
15. Ibid., 503 . 
16. Ibid., 495-496. 
17. Ibid., 502-503. 
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despair about ever bringing our own conduct - let alone the conduct of 
others or the dynamics of institutions - into faithful conformity with such 
exacting moral standards. 18 
Taylor indicates that at the root of such blindness is a "stripped down" 
secular outlook that provides few resources for coherently "seeing good" 
in the world l9 and that is, at best, skeptical about the possibility and value 
of human acknowledgment of divine transcendence.2o These two ele-
ments are connected; they converge on the issue of "self-affmnation," 
which Taylor claims "doesn't have an exact precedent in earlier times."21 
The issue of self-affmnation is not simply about what gives worth to 
various forms of the "self" of modernity. This issue concerns the very 
"goodness of being, "22 the goodness of the world that the self engages 
in its multiple activities. The goodness of the self and of the world have 
both become contestable, inasmuch as modernity and its aftermath have 
shattered the theological horizon against which such affirmations of 
goodness could once confidently be made.23 
In the context of this "crisis of affmnation," Taylor's exploration of 
the possibilities for reviving the human capacity for "seeing good" marks 
one place where his central theological concerns explicitly emerge in his 
text. His exploration has two related facets. The first one has already 
been noted: Possibilities for renewing our human capacity for "seeing 
good" are located in an expressive understanding of language that we 
now can index to a human analogue to the transformative power of God's 
logos of Creation: "What we have in this new issue of affirming the 
goodness of things is the development of a human analogue to God's 
seeing things as good: a seeing which also helps effect what it sees."24 
The second is "a central idea of the Christian tradition, that people are 
transformed through being loved by God, a love that they mediate to one 
another. "25 A brief consideration of these two facets - divine and human -
of transformative power in the logos will provide a transition from 
Part 1's exploration of Creation as a theological sub-text in Taylor's 
account of "the making of the modem identity" to Part n's consideration 
18. Ibid., 520. 
19. Ibid., 447-455. 
20. Ibid., 519-520. 
21. Ibid., 447. 
22. Ibid., 448. 
23. See the fmal chapter, "Homeless," of Neiman, Evil (n. 13), 238-328, for a pro-
vocative account of the shattered horizon of modernity. 
24. Taylor, Sources (n. 1), 449. 
25. Ibid., 449. 
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of the "epiphanic" as locus for a "seeing good" that is effected through 
the transfonnative power of the logos. I will propose that Taylor's account 
of the epiphanic contains elements for a theology of the Incarnation in 
which the enfleshment of the divine completes the divine "seeing good" 
of creation by a "seeing good" that transfonnatively takes into itself the 
brokenness of the world. 
As noted earlier, in "Language and Human Nature" Taylor takes the 
expressive theory of language set in motion by Herder to mark a signifi-
cant shift in the locus of creative agency. In the expressive theory of ontic 
meaning, creative agency was (uniquely) divine; in the new expressive 
theory of language, creative agency is human. This larger account of the 
creative power of human expression has implications for "the crisis of 
affinnation." It is no longer the case that only God's seeing good brings 
about the good it sees: " ... the world's being good may now be seen as 
not entirely independent of our seeing it and showing it as good, at least 
as far as the world of humans is concerned. "26 Such "seeing good," 
moreover, must be such as to encompass ourselves as well as the things 
of the world: "What is new is the modem sense of the place and power 
of the creative imagination. This is now an integral part of the goodness 
of things, and hence the transfonnation of our stance and thus our outlook 
helps bring about the truth it reveals. "27 
On Taylor's account there is thus a "double-sidedness" to the trans-
fonnative power of "seeing good" : The one seeing and the good that is 
seen are mutually implicated in the transfonnation effected in the "see-
ing." Acknowledgment of the possibility of such mutual transfonnation, 
he argues, is not peculiarly modem: " In fact, the notion of a transfonna-
tion of our stance towards the world whereby our vision of it is changed 
has traditionally been connected with the notion of grace. "28 That notion 
of grace, however, was set in a background of a commonly shared order, 
"unmediated by our powers of creative articulation," that provided "a tab-
leau of the spiritual significance of things. "29 Within the "fractured hori-
zons" of modem and post-modem cultures, by contrast, we live in a con-
text "in which a publicly accessible cosmic order of meanings is an 
impossibility. "30 In consequence, that earlier notion of grace has diminished 
power to function effectively as a publicly recognized trope for the trans-
fonning power of "seeing good." 
26. Ibid., 448. 
27. Ibid., 449. 
28 . Ibid. 
29. Ibid., 427. 
30. Ibid. , 512. 
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Given the theological concerns within Taylor's account, he can hardly 
be advocating that we jettison earlier notions of grace. He is proposing, 
instead, an enrichment of the notion of grace that takes into accOunt a 
distinctive modality for recognition of grace that has emerged in moder-
nity. He identifies this modality in terms of "languages of personal reso-
nance" that engage "the search for moral sources outside the subject 
through languages that resonate within him or her, the grasping of an 
order which is inseparably indexed to a personal vision. "31 These lan-
guages of personal resonance offer a specific marker of the human spirit 
emergent from modernity, viz. , an imaginative transformation of our own 
possibilities for "seeing good" in ourselves that then transforms all that 
we see as good. 
Even as Taylor emphasizes the distinctively modem tonality of such 
" languages of personal resonance" as coming from within, he acknowl-
edges that their power as transformative does not come simply from 
within ourselves : Grace - a gift beyond ourselves - and not Pelagian 
self-transformation effects this new "seeing": " Loving the world and 
ourselves is in a sense a miracle, in the face of all the evil and degrada-
tion that it and we contain. "32 The insight is from John 's gospel, but the 
modem tonality is Dostoyevsky's, who 
brings together here a central idea of the Christian tradition, especially evi-
dent in the Gospel of John, that people are transformed through being loved 
by God, a love that they mediate to one another, on the one hand, with the 
modem notion of a subject who can help to bring on transfiguration through 
the stance he takes to himself and the world, on the other. 33 
Taylor'S view harkens to a remark from his earlier discussion of hyper-
goods that touches upon the transformation that love has upon our "see-
ing": "On a Christian view, sanctification involves our sharing to some 
degree God's love (agape) for the world, and this transforms how we see 
things and what else we long for or think important. "34 This remark is 
significant in that it suggests a strategy for locating the theology of Incar-
nation at work in Taylor'S project. In manifesting Taylor'S concern "to 
bring the air back again to the half-collapsed lungs of the spirit,"35 this 
remark echoes the transformational dynamics of the Spiritual Exercises 
of St. Ignatius Loyola. These dynamics move from the recognition (in 
31. Ibid., 510. 
32. Ibid., 452. 
33. Ibid., 452. 
34. Ibid., 70; emphasis mine. 
35 . Ibid., 520. 
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the First Week36) that, even in one's sinful human condition, one is abid-
ingly loved by God to the transformation of one's seeing (in the final 
exercise, the contemplatio ad amorem37) into an optic of "finding God 
in all things." 
A fundamental element in the Ignatian dynamics of transformation is 
signaled in the recurring focus the Spiritual Exercises has upon discern-
ment in decisions that give order to one's "way of life."38 One could 
argue - but that is not a task I undertake here - that this element is 
remarkably anticipatory of that specific marker of the human spirit that 
Taylor sees emerging in modernity, viz., a self-involving transformation 
of self that makes possible a H seeing good" that effects the good it sees. 
Self-involvement in the transformation is key : Ignatius is particularly 
clear that these exercises assist one in making one's own discovery of the 
inner workings of God 's spirit. Freedom - the freedom of God's spirit 
and the freedom of the one making the exercises - are of paramount 
concern for Ignatius. In this he is prescient about the freedom that is a 
major theme of modernity, though with a crucial difference: Ignatius 
does not share a typically modem presupposition that God's freedom and 
human freedom are inevitably pitted against one another in a zero-sum 
game. 
Locating Taylor's theological sub-text within the context of the dynam-
ics of the Spiritual Exercises will thus offer a useful way for noting 
important consequences that his account of the transformative power of 
"seeing good" has for the issue framing this essay : The ironic ways in 
which the pursuit of the high moral aims of modernity have resulted in 
humans inflicting unspeakable violence on one another. It poses the ques-
tion of how might we begin to "see good" in ways that resist the dynam-
ics of destruction that seem to emerge even from high-minded pursuit of 
the hypergoods of modernity. Is there a way of "seeing good" that itself 
might empower such resistance and, if there is, what makes such a seeing 
possible? It is obvious that Taylor does not think that such resistance can 
effectively come from narrowing and lowering our moral and spiritual 
sights but from making them higher and more expansive. But is this pos-
sible without investing these loftier demands upon ourselves with the 
same potential for destruction that has littered the landscape of modernity 
and its aftermath with deadened souls and broken bodies? 
36. The Spiritual Exercises aiSt. Ignatius, trans. Louis J. Puhl (Westminster, MD: The 
Newman Press, 1954) # 60 (30). Citations provide paragraph number first, page numbers 
in parenthesis. 
37. Exercises, # 230-237 (101-103). 
38. Exercises, #163-189 (68-78). 
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An initial answer to these questions lies, I believe, in Taylor's notion 
of the "epiphanic" as a mode of the transformative power of language. 
I will use this notion to explore, in Part II, how there can be a "seeing 
good" that has an expansiveness that empowers resistance to violence. 
This exploration will focus on a particular presentation of a "seeing 
good" that manifests such empowering expansiveness: The Incarnation 
as rendered by St. Ignatius Loyola in the meditation opening the second 
week of the Spiritual Exercises.39 
II 
Taylor's account of the transformative power of the "epiphanic" pro-
vides an apt interpretive focus for the meditation on the Incarnation, pre-
cisely as an optic highlighting how this exercise exhibits the expansive-
ness of God's "seeing good." Within the overall movement of the 
Spiritual Exercises, this meditation encourages a participation in a Trini-
tarian "seeing" of the human enfleshment of God. By imaginatively tak-
ing part in "God's seeing" of the full scope of human conduct in the 
world, one is disposing oneself for God's grace to effect the transfornia-
tion described by Taylor'S remark about sanctification: As I allow my 
seeing of the world to be informed by this agape filled "seeing good" of 
God's, I become open to being transformed in and by that seeing. My 
seeing is to become the "seeing good" of the Incarnation, a "seeing good" 
that responds with agape to the broken human condition that God sees 
with utter clarity. This seeing is astonishingly more expansive than any of 
which I am humanly capable: God, seeing a world in which human beings 
wreak horrific destruction on themselves and on one another, enacts, in 
that seeing, a surpassing good for and in that world - precisely by fully 
entering into it. As "epiphanic," the Incarnation is God's "seeing good" 
that effects full entrance of the divine into human brokenness in all its 
historical particularity, that remains abidingly mindful of that brokenness, 
and in that enduring mindfulness effects transformative healing. The "see-
ing good" of the Ignatian meditation on God's Incarnation well fits Tay-
lor's definition of epiphanic art : " ... a revelation which at the same time 
defines and completes what it makes manifest. "40 
Crucial to my argument, moreover, is that these dynamics of Ignatian 
spirituality - of which this meditation is one exemplar - recognize that the 
39. Exercises, #101-109 (49-51). 
40. Taylor, Sources (n. 1),419. 
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full expansiveness of good of which the graced human spirit is capable of 
enacting has its source in the unsurpassable expansiveness of good effected 
in God's creating, redeeming and sanctifying" seeing." The expansiveness 
of God's "seeing good" in Creation is exceeded in God's "seeing good" 
a world in need of the enfleshment of God for its redemption, a world that 
by God's enfleshment becomes a dwelling place for the transforming activ-
ity of the Spirit. The Exercises begin with a "seeing" of all creation 
through "The First Principle and Foundation,"41 an optic of God's salvific 
purposes for humankind. They continue through the optic of God incarnate 
as salvation is enacted in the ministry, passion and resurrection of Jesus. 
They conclude through the pneumatological optic of God's enacted love 
operative through all creation, marked by images of God's abundantly 
active love in the contemplatio ad amorem.42 
This Trinitarian pattern of divine expansiveness provides conditions 
for transforming our human seeing and enactment of good. This seems 
consonant with Taylor's view that only in virtue of such a transformation 
- i.e., one that enables us genuinely to embrace the full range of our good 
and the good of the world - will we be able to enact in full, without 
destruction and violence, the high moral aims of justice and benevolence 
modernity has set before US.43 He maintains that, in the absence of such 
transformation, affirmation of the good of human dignity is unlikely to 
be robust enough to empower effective, enduring resistance to the temp-
tation to inflict - in the name of what is good, true, and even holy - indi-
vidual, collective, and systemic violence upon one another: 
We have to search for a way in which our strongest aspirations towards 
hypergoods do not exact a price of self-mutilation. I believe that such a 
reconciliation is possible; but its essential condition is that we enable our-
selves to recognize the goods to which we cannot but hold allegiance in 
their full range.44 
His discussion of the "crisis of affirmation" refines this remark in two 
important ways. First, he indicates that "enabling ourselves" to recognize 
41. Exercises, #23 (12). 
42. Exercises, # 230-237 (101-103). The Spiritual Exercises does not include a medi-
tation on Pentecost. This might appear as inexplicable neglect of the Spirit by Ignatius, 
for whom the mystery of the Trinity was so formative. My proposal that the contemplatio 
ad amorem is a key locus in the Spiritual Exercises for acknowledging the work of the 
Spirit is offered as a first step in recognizing the pneumatological current running deeply 
in the Exercises, though the Holy Spirit is rarely named in the text. 
43. Taylor is not arguing for an exclusively Christian configuration to such transforma-
tion. See Charles Taylor, A Catholic Modernity ? Charles Taylor's Marianist Award Lec-
ture, ed. James L. Heft (New York/Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999) 19-25. 
44. Taylor, Sources (n. I), 106; emphasis mine. 
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the full range of human goods is not something we can accomplish all 
by ourselves. In theological terms, what empowers us to "enable OUr-
selves" to recognize these goods in their full range is a prior operation 
of grace upon us. Second, there is a close connection between appropri-
ate self-affIrmation, on the one hand, and inclusive affirmation of the full 
good of the world, in both its human and non-human dimensions, on the 
other. Narrowing or undermining of one side of this affIrmation results 
in narrowing or undermining the other.45 We have placed ourselves in a 
double-bind in the course of modernity and its aftermath by occluding 
our vision of the robust moral sources that make possible a mutually 
enriching, and comprehensive affIrmation of both our own worth and the 
worth of the world. Out of this double-bind emerge many of the conten-
tions from which we pit good against good even to the point of violence, 
since robust affIrmation on either side does not guarantee effective enact-
ment of good. It may even lead to its opposite: 
A lofty humanism posits high standards of self-worth and a magnificent 
goal to strive toward. It inspires enterprises of great moment. But by this 
very token it encourages force, despotism, tutelage, ultimately contempt, 
and a certain ruthlessness in shaping refractory human material.46 
Taylor takes effective response to this double-bind to lie "somewhere 
in the tum to transcendence - that is, through the full hearted love of 
some good beyond life," which he also sees as the "only way to escape 
the draw to violence" entangled in the imperious demands of hyper-
goods.47 These affirmations raise many issues both within and beyond 
the purview of this essay; of the directly relevant issues, space allows 
only for treatment of one, but I believe it offers an appropriate locus to 
conclude a discussion aimed at exploring an anthropology of the human 
spirit from resources in Taylor's work. This issue can be framed in Tay-
lor's own words: "acknowledging the transcendent means being called 
to a change of identity. "48 With respect to the Incarnation as presented 
in the Spiritual Exercises, this suggests that we attend to the dynamics of 
the transformation of identity that are "epiphanically" encountered in the 
"seeing good" displayed in the meditation by asking two questions: 
First, what transformation of identity is effected by the [Triune] divine 
"seeing" that "look[s] down upon the whole expanse or circuit of all the 
earth, fIlled with human beings [and] .. . see[s] that all are going down to 
45 . He gives this further development in Catholic Modernity, 30-37. 
46. Taylor, Catholic Modernity (n. 43), 33. 
47 . Ibid., 28-29. 
48 . Ibid., 21. 
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hell" and, in and from that "seeing," decrees that "the Second Person 
should become man to save the human race" ?49 Second, how might such 
a transformation of identity empower effective resistance to the destruc-
tive violence that has marked human engagement with high moral aims 
of modernity? 
Let me close with three brief, hesitant suggestions, two to the first 
question, one to the second: Might we entertain the possibility that the 
first transformation effected by this seeing is nothing less than a trans-
formation of the divine that, in Christian theology, has been articulated 
as the doctrine of the Incarnation? The human enfleshment of God's 
logos becomes the completion of God's "seeing good" in Creation in a 
way radically unforeseeable from the perspective of any created "see-
ing." The "event" of Incarnation is radical in the manner it effects the 
good that its seeing brings to be. The enfleshment of God, a graciousness 
and gratuity utterly beyond our comprehension, is an unforeseeable com-
pletion of the Godself by God's free self-binding to humanity and crea-
tion in their brokenness. This radicality, captured in the Pauline image of 
kenosis, has its transformative impact for us articulated in an insight 
Taylor attributes to Dostoyevsky : "Accepting to be part of the world 
contributes to healing it. "50 
The Dostoyevskian insight leads to a less hesitant suggestion about a 
second transformation of identity effected in the " seeing" presented in 
the meditation on the Incarnation. This second transformation is effected 
in the person making the Exercises. The meditation offers the invitation 
to transform our capacity for "seeing good" by participating in the Incar-
nation as the completion of God's "seeing good" in creation. To par-
ticipate in this divine seeing is to allow it to become a power for enacting 
that incarnational seeing in the manner of one 's own life. This is signaled 
in the "Third Prelude" that specifies what is to be desired in all the con-
templations of Jesus ' life and ministry in the second week : "An intimate 
knowledge of our Lord, who has become man for me, that I may love 
Him more and follow Him more closely. "51 The crucial dynamics of this 
transformation are not matters of mere external imitation, but of inner 
appropriation resonant with the Pauline exhortation in Philippians 2:5 
preceding the kenotic hymn: "Let the same mind be in you that was in 
Christ Jesus." 
49. Exercises, # 102 (49). 
50. Taylor, Sources (n. 1), 454. 
51. Exercises, # 104 (49) ; emphasis mine. 
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Both these suggestions offer a direction for response to the third ques-
tion : The Incarnation is God's "seeing good" that in Jesus effects God's 
own enfleshed resistance to all destructive violence - beginning with that 
inflicted on Abel by his brother Cain - done in the name of human aspi-
rations. The transformation to which we are invited by God's "accepting 
to be part of the world" - of the very world in which such violence takes 
place - is to let God's seeing similarly transform us so that we, who are 
creatures of enfleshed spirit, enact the resistance to violence that the 
enfleshed God enacted for us. 
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